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THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME-EXCEPT WHEN YOU ARE
UNDER ARREST: THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS OF
HOME ARRESTS IN UNITED STATES v. VEAL
"[Pihysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of
the Fourth Amendment is directed. "I
I. INTRODUCTION
For defendants awaiting trial or appealing a conviction, a court's in-
terpretation of three words-"reason to believe"-can significantly alter
their lives. 2 These three words, articulated by the Supreme Court in Pay-
ton v. New York,3 without any elaboration of their meaning, became the
source of conflicting interpretations by the circuit courts. 4 As a result,
varied trial outcomes exist among the circuits and equally varied police
procedures occur in departments across the nation. 5 The Court provided
these words to answer a seemingly simple question: How certain must a
police officer be that a suspect is home prior to entering the residence to
effectuate an arrest?
6
Payton allows police officers armed with an arrest warrant to enter a
suspect's residence when they have "reason to believe" that the suspect is
1. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (citing United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).
2. See id. at 603 (holding that consistent with Fourth Amendment, police of-
ficers armed with arrest warrant may enter suspect's dwelling when there is "reason
to believe" suspect is inside).
3. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002)
("[T]he 'reason to believe' standard is far from clear. The Supreme Court did not
define the 'reason to believe' standard in Payton nor has it defined the standard
subsequently."); United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1995)
("The 'reason to believe' standard was not defined in Payton, and since Payton,
neither the Supreme Court, nor the courts of appeals have provided much illumi-
nation."); see also Matthew A. Edwards, Posner's Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests,
77 WASH. L. REv. 299, 339-40 (2002) ("[R]ecent Supreme Court case law demon-
strates unequivocal support for Payton, although unfortunately without providing
much guidance as to the content of the Payton standard.").
5. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue Code or
Body of Principles?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 956, 1016 (2006) (discussing burden on
police officers who are implementing Fourth Amendment law). Police officers
have particular difficulty discerning whether entry into a residence to arrest an
individual or to search the premises is constitutionally permitted. See id. at 1016
(same).
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present in the residence. 7 Across the circuits, courts construe the Payton
"reason to believe" standard to mean that the police must have either
probable cause 8 or something less than probable cause, such as a reasona-
ble belief.9 Consequently, most criminal defendants arrested in their
7. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 603 ("[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an arrest
warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority
to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the
suspect is within.").
8. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1239 (8th ed. 2004) ("[Probable cause is a]
reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a
crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime."). But see
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-97 (1996) ("Articulating precisely what'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause' mean is not possible. They are com-
monsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with 'the factual and practical con-
siderations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act."') (citations omitted). Legal scholars have also had difficulty fix-
ing a standard to probable cause and many doubt whether it is even possible to do
so. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 19 (1997) ("[P]robable cause cannot be a fixed standard. It would
make little sense to insist on the same amount of probability regardless of the
imminence of the harm, the intrusiveness of the search . . . ."); Christopher
Slobogin, Let's Not Bury Terry: A Call for the Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Princi-
ple, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1053, 1082 (1998) ("[Probable cause] is the standard with
which we are most familiar-except we don't really know what it means."). Fur-
thermore,, the FBI has acknowledged the difficulty of defining probable cause,
which is especially troublesome because police officers are expected to apply that
standard "with some exactness" each day. See Edward HendrieJ.D., InferringProba-
ble Cause, FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, 71 (2) (February 2002): 23-32, available
at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2002/febO2leb.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2007) (discussing complexities of probable cause). Hendrie states:
Probable cause is a somewhat nebulous standard .... Many have tried to
apply "a one size fits all" standard of probable cause to every situation,
because they believe that probable cause is one consistent standard of
proof that occupies a fixed point. In fact, probable cause offers a range
of proofs that occupies a zone.
Id.
9. Compare United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 485 (6th Cir. 2006)
("[Rileasonable belief is a lesser standard than probable cause, and that reasonable
belief that a suspect is within the residence ... is required to enter a residence to
enforce an arrest warrant."), with Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1111 ("We now hold that the'reason to believe,' or reasonable belief, standard of Payton ... embodies the same
standard of reasonableness inherent in probable cause."), and United States v. Ag-
new, 407 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Payton establishes that police may enter a
suspect's residence to make an arrest armed only with an arrest warrant if they
have probable cause to believe that the suspect is in the home."). Commentators
have likened "reason to believe" to "reasonable suspicion," set forth in Terry v.
Ohio. See Edwards, supra note 4, at 363-64 (analogizing reasonable belief to reason-
able suspicion) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). Further, the Su-
preme Court has compared the requirements of reasonable suspicion with those of
probable cause. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (elaborating on
difference between reasonable suspicion and probable cause). The Court
provided:
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause
not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with
information that is different in quantity or content than that required to
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion
2
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homes move to exclude incriminating evidence seized during their ar-
rest-evidence that typically will play a major part in their eventual
convictions.' 0
In United States v. Veal,'' the Third Circuit held that police could sat-
isfy the Payton "reason to believe" standard with probable cause. 12 The
court, however, left the door open and hinted to practitioners that a lesser
standard might suffice. 13 The Veal court's failure to provide a bright-line
rule significantly affects how police officers approach home arrests and
how defense lawyers seek to adequately represent clients. 14
This Casebrief discusses the Third Circuit's preferred analysis of the
standard that police officers possessing an arrest warrant must use to de-
termine whether a suspect is presently home. In addition, this Casebrief
serves as a guide to practitioners bringing or defending against such chal-
lenges in the Third Circuit.15 Part II summarizes the Payton standard, spe-
cifically its application in the Third Circuit and in other circuits. 16 Part III
outlines the facts and procedural history of Veal' 7 Part III also delineates
the Third Circuit's approach in deciding the requisite certainty required
under Payton.' 8 Part IV provides practical suggestions and predictions for
Third Circuit practitioners regarding the application and the future of the
Payton standard in the Third Circuit.' 9 Part V concludes that the Third
can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause.
Id.
10. See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 6.1 (a), at 262 (4th ed. 2004) (asserting that whether particular entry
by police for purposes of making arrest was lawful "becomes a matter of critical
importance if evidence is obtained as a consequence of the entry").
11. 453 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2006).
12. See id. at 167 n.3 (discussing different interpretations of Payton standard
and applying probable cause test based on Third Circuit precedent). Because the
probable cause standard was met, the court declined to decide whether "a possibly
lower standard of reasonable belief should be applied here." Id. (acknowledging
possibility of lesser standard under Payton).
13. See id. at 167 (leaving open possibility that another standard could exist in
Third Circuit).
14. See id. (same).
15. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's preferred analysis, see infra notes
101-23 and accompanying text. For a discussion of suggestions to practitioners, see
infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of Payton and its application in the circuit courts, includ-
ing the Third Circuit, see infra notes 37-83 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the relevant facts and procedural history of Vea4 see
infra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Veal, see infra notes 101-
23 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of suggestions and predictions for Third Circuit practi-
tioners, see infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
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Circuit should adopt a lesser standard consistent with language used by
the Supreme Court and its sister circuits.
20
II. BACKGROUND
A. Home Arrests: Payton v. New York and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to
all searches and seizures conducted by government agents.2 1 Specifically,
the Amendment's first clause provides Americans with protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures; its second clause requires that search
and arrest warrants be both specific and supported by probable cause.
22
Yet, the relationship between these two clauses has caused courts to strug-
gle with interpreting and applying the Fourth Amendment.
2 3 When de-
ciding Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, courts must balance
an individual's privacy rights against the government's need to investigate
crimes.2 4 The significant effect that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
has on both the lives of citizens and the future of law enforcement further
20. For a discussion of why the Third Circuit should adopt a lesser standard
under Payton, see infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
21. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV (outlining constitutional protections). Specifi-
cally, the Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
22. See id. (providing language of Fourth Amendment).
23. See John C. Miner, Reason to Believe: The Key to Warrantless Entry-United
States v. Gorman, 25 WHITTIER L. REv. 181, 195 (2003) (acknowledging "high level
of confusion" in Fourth Amendment law); Sarah E. Rosenberg, Comment, Buie
Signals: Has an Arrest Warrant Become a License to Fish in Private Waters?, 41 EMORY L.J.
321, 321 (1992) (contending that Supreme Court grapples with language of
Fourth Amendment). Further, differing interpretations of the relationship be-
tween the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment complicate the inquiry. See Bryan
Murray, Note, After United States v. Vaneaton, Does Payton v. New York Prevent
Police from Making Warrantless Routine Arrests Inside the Home?, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REv. 135, 137 (1996) (discussing different interpretations of relationship between
two clauses). Specifically, one interpretation provides that the second clause
defines the first clause, resulting in a reasonable search and seizure requiring a
warrant unless exceptional circumstances exist. See id. at 138 (explaining interpre-
tation of relationship between clauses of Fourth Amendment). Another interpre-
tation, as derived from the Supreme Court, reads the clauses independently and
balances an individual's expectation of privacy against the government's interest in
investigating a crime. See id. (same).
24. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) ("[T]he permissibility of
a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual's fourth amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate gov-
ernmental interests."); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment
Seizure Analysis after Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 799, 799-800
(1991) (discussing balancing test applied by Supreme Court in Fourth Amend-
ment cases).
[Vol. 52: p. 10211024
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complicates the struggle. 25 For example, if a court finds a Fourth Amend-
ment violation by the police, the likely result is that the evidence would be
inadmissible and hence unavailable, thereby possibly allowing a guilty de-
fendant to go free.
26
Most Fourth Amendment cases involve searches and seizures occur-
ring in an individual's home, which is a place afforded extensive constitu-
tional protection. 2 7 The seventeenth century English adage "a man's
home is his castle" embodies the sine qua non of the Fourth Amendment,
which remains unchanged today.2 8 Judges and legal scholars use this cas-
tle adage to highlight the historical and political significance of the Fourth
Amendment.2 9 As such, the Fourth Amendment draws the line at the en-
25. See Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 1016 (finding numerous Supreme Court
decisions confusing for police).
26. See id. at 956-57 (commenting on effects of Fourth Amendment
decisions).
27. See Payton v. NewYork, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) ("In none is the zone of
privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that finds its roots in clear and spe-
cific constitutional terms."); id. at 587 ("'Freedom from intrusion into the home or
dwelling is the archetype of the privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amend-
ment."' (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970)));
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core [of the
Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."); see also Tracey Maclin,
Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 72 Miss. L.J. 51, 113 (2002) (noting that Supreme Court affords individual's
home "the most scrupulous protection").
28. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 597 (quoting Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a (K.B.
1603)); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 100 (1998) (explaining that this
adage "has acquired over time a power and an independent significance justifying
a more general assurance of personal security in one's home, an assurance which
has become part of our constitutional tradition"); United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d
841, 847 (2d Cir. 1990) (mentioning strong American belief in home as "inviolate
castle and keep"); Miner, supra note 23, at 181 (contending that adage is sine qua
non of Fourth Amendment and observing that this once simple concept has now
become complex in practice).
29. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (noting that Fourth Amend-
ment embodies "centuries-old principle" of respecting privacy of home); see also
David I. Caplan & Sue Wimmershoff-Caplan, Postmodernism and the Model Penal Code
v. The Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments-And the Castle Privacy Doctrine in the
Twenty-First Century, 73 UMKC L. REv. 1073, 1083-84 (2005) (discussing scholarly
interest in castle adage);Jonathan L. Hafetz, "A Man's Home is His Castle?" Reflec-
tions on the Home, the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries, 8 WM. & MARVJ. WOMEN & L. 175, 175-76 (2002) (noting that adage
"forms part of the fabric" of Fourth Amendment and scholars explain adage to
symbolize home's important place in search and seizure law); Linda C. McClain,
Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
195, 202 (1995) (commenting on why jurists use castle maxim and noting that it
provides privacy defense in tort law and constitutional law, "with a common theme
of restricting access and keeping others out"); Nathan H. Seltzer, Wen History Mat-
ters Not: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Secret Search, 40 CRiM. L. BULL. 1, 5
(2004) ("[Framers] valued sanctity and security of home" and when Framers
adopted Fourth Amendment, they extended "the English tradition that a man's
house is his castle."); see also Deleith Duke Gossett, Note, Constitutional Law and
2007] CASEBRIEF 1025
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trance of a home for purposes of executing search warrants or arrests.3 0
Accordingly, absent exigent circumstances, government agents may not
cross the threshold of a person's home without a warrant.
3 1
As the law of search and seizure, particularly the law surrounding
home entry, became increasingly complicated and riddled with excep-
tions, the Supreme Court took the opportunity in Payton to distinguish
between entering a home to search and entering a home to arrest.3 2 The
Criminal Procedure-Media Ride-Alongs into the Home: Can They Suruive a Head-On Col-
lision between First and Fourth Amendment Rights?, 22 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv.
679, 700 (2000) (commenting that castle adage symbolizes respect for home,
which is "embedded in historical traditions and embodied in our constitutional
framework").
30. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 ("Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at
the entrance to the house."); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001)
(reiterating precedent that Fourth Amendment draws line at entrance to home
and elaborating that line "must not only be firm but also bright"); Michael R.
Stahlman, New Developments in Search and Seizure: More than Just a Matter of Semantics,
2002 ARmy LAw. 31, 35 (2002) (classifying Supreme Court principle of drawing
line at entrance of home as "bedrock protection under Fourth Amendment").
31. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 (pronouncing rule on home entry consistent
with Fourth Amendment).
32. See Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 957 (finding that over past forty-five years,
Supreme Court has complicated meaning of Fourth Amendment and because of
numerous rules and sub-rules created, Fourth Amendment law "has begun to take
on the shape of an Internal Revenue Code (a hodgepodge of rules enacted by
ever-shifting coalitions of decision makers) rather than a body of coherent princi-
ples (of the type often associated with judicial decisions and reasoning)"); see also
Payton, 445 U.S. at 589 (describing that any difference between two intrusions "are
merely ones of degree rather than kind" and they both share fundamental charac-
teristic of "the breach of the entrance to an individual's home").
In Payton, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a New York statute that
allowed police officers to enter a suspect's residence to effectuate an arrest without
a warrant, consent or exigent circumstances. See id. at 574 (describing New York
statute at issue). The Court consolidated two similar cases, Payton v. New York and
Riddick v. New York where the defendants were both convicted of crimes and evi-
dence seized from their homes was used against them in court. See id. at 573
(describing cases on appeal). In Payton's case, the police had probable cause to
believe that Payton had committed a murder, and six officers went to Payton's
address to arrest him without a warrant. See id. at 576 (reciting facts of case). The
police knocked on Payton's door and, despite the lights being on and music play-
ing inside, Payton did not respond. See id. (same). The police then used crowbars
to break open the door and seized a shell casing which was later admitted into
evidence at Payton's trial. See id. at 576-77 (same). Payton eventually surrendered
to the police, was indicted for murder and moved to suppress the shell casing
taken from his home. See id. at 577 (describing procedural history).
In Riddick, victims identified the defendant as the person who committed two
armed robberies in 1971. See id. at 578 (detailing facts of Riddick). The police
learned of Riddick's address but they did not obtain a warrant for his arrest. See id.
(same). A detective and three police officers knocked on Riddick's door and his
young son opened the door. See id. (same). The police officers could see Riddick
sitting in bed covering himself with a sheet. See id. (same). The police entered the
house, arrested Riddick and then searched for weapons by opening a chest of
drawers near the bed, where they found narcotics and other paraphernalia. See id.
(describing arrest and subsequent search). Riddick was later indicted on narcotics
charges and moved to have the evidence suppressed. See id. (reciting procedural
1026 [Vol. 52: p. 1021
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issue confronting courts at the time was whether entering the home to
search and entering to arrest required the same constitutional protec-
tion-a warrant. 33 The Payton Court ultimately held that only in exigent
circumstances, a police officer may enter a suspect's home to arrest a sus-
pect without an arrest warrant.34 The Court then concluded its opinion
with its most oft-cited language: "[F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, an
arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the lim-
ited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is
reason to believe the suspect is within." 35 Payton not only continues to
govern the law on home arrests today, but its meaning continues to be the
subject of considerable analysis in the federal circuit courts.
36
B. Other Circuits' Interpretation and Application of Payton
1. Payton Requires Less than Probable Cause
The circuit courts that held Payton requires less than probable cause
tended to rely on the plain language of the Payton decision, specifically
focusing on the Supreme Court's word choice.3 7 For example, in United
history). The trial judge ruled that the police's warrantless entry into Riddick's
home was valid under the New York statute and that the subsequent search was
reasonable. See id. at 577-78 (same). In both cases, the Appellate Division and the
New York Court of Appeals upheld the convictions and refused to suppress the
evidence. See id. at 580 (noting New York Court of Appeals affirmed both convic-
tions in one opinion).
33. Compare Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(holding that entering home to arrest and to search and seize both involve same
interest in protecting privacy of home, therefore requiring same constitutional
protection), with People v. Payton, 380 N.E.2d 224, 228-29 (N.Y. 1978) (finding
significant difference between intruding for searching premises and entry for mak-
ing arrest, including difference in governmental interest in accomplishing purpose
of intrusion in each instance), rev'd 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
34. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 (holding that "absent exigent circumstances"
police seeking to arrest suspect may not enter suspect's home without arrest war-
rant). The Court reversed the judgments against the Payton defendants because
the police officers had failed to obtain arrest warrants. See id. (applying holding to
instant case).
35. See id. (setting forth law on constitutionality of home arrests). The Payton
majority supported its holding about the authority within an arrest warrant by rea-
soning that "[i]f there is sufficient evidence of a citizen's participation in a felony
to persuade ajudicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasona-
ble to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law." Id. at 602-03
(highlighting importance ofjudicial officer's approval and subsequent issuance of
arrest warrant).
36. See LAFAvE, supra note 10, at 265 (noting that meaning of Payton continues
to be uncertain); Edwards, supra note 4, at 334 (acknowledging that although Pay-
ton seems to set forth straightforward rules for police, implementation of Payton
over past two decades has raised challenging issues).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 484 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding
that Supreme Court's use of different terms indicates its intent to apply different
standards); United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding
that because Supreme Court did not use words "probable cause," it intended some-
thing other than what is required of probable cause).
2007] 1027
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States v. Pruitt,38 the Sixth Circuit interpreted Payton's "reason to believe"
standard to mean that police officers must consider common sense fac-
tors and the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a
suspect is inside of a residence. 39 In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit focused
closely on the language the Supreme Court used in Payton.40 Specifically,
the court reasoned that because the Payton Court used the words "proba-
ble cause" to describe obtaining an arrest warrant and the words "reason
to believe" to describe entering a dwelling, the Court must have intended
each phrase to have a different meaning.41 As such, the Pruitt court de-
duced from this language that the reasonable belief standard requires a
lower burden of proof than probable cause.
4 2
Moreover, to supplement its interpretation of Payton, the Sixth Circuit
analyzed another case in which the Supreme Court used both "probable
cause" and "reason to believe" in consecutive sentences.43 This provided
38. 458 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 2006).
39. See id. at 483 (describing requirements to formulate reasonable belief that
suspect is on premises). Examples of "common sense" factors deemed sufficient
by the court to meet the lesser-standard of reasonable belief include hearing the
television inside of the home and the presence of the suspect's car in the driveway
when arriving at the suspect's home early in the morning. See id. (citing United
States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1997) (" [F]inding that sound of televi-
sion on the inside of the house and the presence of a car in the driveway was
sufficient to form basis of the reasonable belief that the suspect was inside of the
home.").
40. See id. at 484 (scrutinizing language used in Payton to determine that
Court did not intend for probable cause to be standard used to describe police
officer's authority to enter suspect's dwelling).
41. See id. ("Had the Court intended probable cause to be the standard for
entering a residence, it would have either expressly stated so or used the same
term for both situations. Instead, its use of different terms indicates that it in-
tended different standards to apply."). The Sixth Circuit relied on the D.C. Cir-
cuit's analysis of the Supreme Court's choice of "reason to believe." See id. (citing
United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). In Thomas, the D.C.
Circuit reasoned that it is more than "likely ... that the Supreme Court in Payton
used a phrase other than 'probable cause' because it meant something other than
'probable cause.'" Thomas, 429 F.3d at 286.
42. See Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 484 (finding reasonable belief standard to be less
stringent than probable cause).
43. See id. (analyzing language used in Supreme Court precedent). Specifi-
cally, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the following language to exemplify its interpreta-
tion of Payton:
[Bly requiring a protective sweep to be justified by probable cause to be-
lieve that a serious and demonstrable potentiality for danger existed, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland applied an unnecessarily strict Fourth
Amendment standard. The Fourth Amendment permits a properly lim-
ited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the
searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articul-
able facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger
to those on the arrest scene.
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1990) (emphasis added). But see United
States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1995) (rejecting Buie's reasoning).
The Magluta court concluded:
1028 [Vol. 52: p. 1021
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support for the Sixth Circuit to establish not only that the phrases have
different meanings, but also that the Court does not use the terms inter-
changeably. 44 The Sixth Circuit's approach illustrates the interpretation
adopted by a majority of the circuit courts applying the Payton reason to
believe standard. 45 Further, commentators who agree with this approach
argue that a police officer's duties should not be further complicated by
imposing an additional probable cause requirement.
4 6
[T]he Court's language in Buie is not dispositive, because the Court there
merely reasoned that based on the facts of Buie the police officers' posses-
sion of probable cause entitled them to enter and sweep the residence-
the Court did not and has not, ever held that probable cause is required to
enter a residence to execute an arrest warrant for the resident.
Id.
44. See Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 484 (concluding that because Supreme Court did
not use terms interchangeably, it "considers reasonable belief to be a less stringent
standard than probable cause"); see also LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 264 (comment-
ing that Supreme Court phrased Payton standard "so as not to encourage lower
courts to adopt a hard-nosed 'probable cause to believe suspect is home' test").
45. See, e.g., Thomas, 429 F.3d at 286 (finding that Payton Court did not intend
probable cause to be standard). The Thomas court provided:
We think it more likely, however, that the Supreme Court in Payton used
a phrase other than 'probable cause' because it meant something other
than 'probable cause.' Accordingly, we expressly hold that an officer exe-
cuting an arrest warrant may enter a dwelling if he has only a 'reasonable
belief,' falling short of probable cause to believe, the suspect lives there
and is present at the time.
Id.; see also Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 1999) (interpret-
ing Payton as requiring lesser knowledge standard than probable cause); United
States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 63 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that distinct from probable
cause, "reason to believe standard" allows police officer with arrest warrant to as-
certain whether suspect is "probably within certain premises without an additional
trip to the magistrate" to obtain search warrant to enter); United States v. Risse, 83
F.3d 212, 216 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying lesser standard under Payton and elaborat-
ing that police officers' assessment of whether suspect is present in residence
"need not in fact be correct;" instead they must "reasonably believe" that suspect
both resides and is present inside dwelling); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212,
215 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting probable cause as knowledge requirement under
Payton and instead adopting less stringent standard); Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1534
("[The] strongest support for a lesser burden than probable cause remains the
text of Payton, and what we must assume was a conscious effort on the part of the
Supreme Court in choosing the verbal formulation of 'reason to believe' over that
of 'probable cause."'); Edwards, supra note 4, at 363 ("Most courts have held that
Payton reason to believe requires less proof than probable cause.").
46. See LAFAvE, supra note 10, at 266 (discussing effect of additional burden of
probable cause on police); Miner, supra note 23, at 201 (advocating standard with
which police can easily work); Saltzburg supra note 5, at 1016 (suggesting solutions
to ease burden on police). But see Edwards, supra note 4, at 373 (theorizing that
close review of decisions applying Payton standard reveals that reason to believe has
no more discernable meaning than probable cause). Edwards elaborates that even
though the "reason to believe" standard appears as if it requires less proof than
probable cause, the courts implementing probable cause are just as lenient as the
courts applying a lesser standard. See id. (finding legal reasoning fails in discerning
difference in application of standards).
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2. Payton Standard is Equivalent to Probable Cause
In United States v. Gorman,4 7 the Ninth Circuit became the first and
only circuit to equate the reasonable belief standard with probable
cause. 48 In so holding, the court relied on instances where the terms
"probable cause" and "reason to believe" were used synonymously in the
Payton setting.49 In addition, the Ninth Circuit analyzed probable cause as
"a concept of reasonableness" to deduce that both reasonable belief and
probable cause derive from the same standard of reasonableness, and thus
are the same. 50 Further, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that neither Payton
nor its own precedent prevented it from equating probable cause with
47. 314 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2002).
48. See id. at 1111 (footnote omitted) ("'[T]he reason to believe,' or reasona-
ble belief, standard of Payton. .. embodies the same standard of reasonableness
inherent in probable cause."); see also Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 483 (announcing Ninth
Circuit alone held reasonable belief standard is same as probable cause for pur-
poses of determining whether suspect is inside residence). Although the Third
Circuit employed probable cause as the standard in Veal, it did not outwardly
equate the two standards and left open the possibility of a lesser standard. See
United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (addressing dual inter-
pretations of Payton and refusing to decide whether lower standard should apply in
instant case because probable cause was already met); cf. Edwards, supra note 4, at
362 (finding that "efforts to illuminate the Payton standard by comparing it to
probable cause are fruitless and highlight the weakness of traditional legal reason-
ing in this context").
49. See Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1114 (citing court's own precedent to exemplify
that probable cause and reason to believe entail same protections). Specifically,
the court cited to United States v. Harper, a case in which it used the term "probable
cause" to describe the legality of the police's entry in a suspect's dwelling. See id.
(distinguishing "probable cause" standard).
[F]or example, we explicitly used the probable cause standard to find
that the entry and search of David and Adrian Harper's residence pursu-
ant to an arrest warrant for David was legal: Once the police possess [ed]
an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe [David] was in his home,
the officers were entitled to search anywhere in the house in which [he]
might be found.
Id. (quoting Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1991)) (citations omitted). The
Ninth Circuit also relied on the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of Payton: "'Payton
authorizes entry on the basis of the existing arrest warrant for the defendant and
probable cause to believe that the defendant was within the premises.'" See id. at
1114 (quoting United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d 1090, 1093 (8th Cir. 1981)) (em-
phasis added).
50. See id. at 1113 (describing Fifth Circuit decision that addresses standard of
reasonableness embedded in probable cause). The Gorman court then quoted the
Fifth Circuit, which provided: "Reasonable belief embodies the same standards of reasona-
bleness but allows the officer, who has already been to the magistrate to secure an
arrest warrant, to determine that the suspect is probably within certain premises
without an additional trip to the magistrate and without exigent circumstances."
Id. (quoting United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 421 (5th Cir.1977)); cf. Miner,
supra note 23, at 195 (critiquing Gorman and stating that Cravero court "offered no
more than an equivocation on the subject of what 'reason to believe' means. The
court simply stated that probable cause is essentially the same as 'reason to
believe'").
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"reason to believe."'5' Thus, relying on its own rule and its own definition
of "reason to believe," a unanimous court in Gorman held that police may
enter any residence pursuant to an arrest warrant when they have proba-
ble cause to believe the suspect is within the premises. 5 2 By equating "rea-
son to believe" with probable cause, Gorman represents one approach to
interpreting the Payton standard.
55
C. Prior Third Circuit Precedent
In recent decisions, the Third Circuit has tended to employ the prob-
able cause standard when applying Payton.54 It is difficult, however, to de-
termine under what circumstances the court would permit a lesser
standard to exist.55 The court's holdings in United States v. Agnew5 6 and
United States v. Edmonds5 7 embody the relevant Third Circuit precedent.58
51. See Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1114 (discussing possibility that both standards are
equivalent).
Nothing in Underwood or Payton precludes us from using the same stan-
dard of reasonableness embedded in probable cause as the standard of
reasonableness for the "reason to believe" standard. Rather, Underwood,
Payton, and our subsequent cases suggest that the standard of probable
cause, and not of reasonable suspicion, is the standard already being ap-
plied in this Circuit.
Id. But see Miner, supra note 23, at 197 (finding Gorman court's reasoning sus-
pect). Miner further asserts that the Gorman court merely reasserts "reason to
believe" or takes cases out of context while citing "only that portion of a rule that
agrees with its holding, even when the cited rule is in opposition to the court's own
holding." Id.
52. See Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1114-15 (concluding reason to believe should be
interpreted to "entail the same protection and reasonableness inherent in proba-
ble cause"). But see Miner, supra note 23, at 189 (criticizing Gorman and finding
that facts and legal analysis of applicable case law "reveal an altogether different
reality" than Gorman court portrayed).
53. See Gorman, 314 F.3d at 1114-15 (equating "reason to believe" with "proba-
ble cause"); see also Miner, supra note 23, at 183 (noting Ninth Circuit as first cir-
cuit court to equate reasonable belief standard with probable cause).
54. See United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing
Payton as requiring police to have probable cause that suspect is in home, yet quot-
ing another circuit that describes standard as requiring merely reasonable belief).
55. See id. (same); United States v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1247 (3d Cir.
1995) (addressing Payton as requiring "probable cause" but also framing inquiry as
involving "reasonable grounds to believe").
56. 407 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005).
57. 52 F.3d 1236 (3d Cir. 1995).
58. See generally Agnew, 407 F.3d at 193 (holding probable cause existed when
defendant was in home because police saw him through window); Edmonds, 52
F.3d at 1247 (addressing constitutionality of home arrest).
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1. United States v. Agnew
In United States v. Agnew, the Third Circuit phrased the Payton stan-
dard as requiring probable cause. 59 As a result, the Agnew court found
probable cause to believe the defendant was in a home because the police
saw him through a window. 60 The court convicted the defendant of dis-
tributing crack cocaine and being a felon in possession of a firearm.6 1
The police officers obtained the evidence used to secure the conviction
when they entered the defendant's home pursuant to an arrest warrant.
62
In holding the arrest constitutional, the court relied on Payton.
63
Without any explanation, however, the court phrased the inquiry as one
that required "probable cause" for the police to believe that the defendant
was inside of the residence. 64 The court proceeded to quote the Payton
standard, including the phrase "reason to believe"; however, in summariz-
ing the law and applying it to the facts, the court reverted to the words
"probable cause." 65 Thus, the Third Circuit in Agnew apparently adopted
the probable cause standard without ever addressing why and whether any
differences existed between the standard it employed in Agnew and the
standard set forth by Payton.
66
Moreover, the Agnew court also addressed the issue of police entry
into a third party's residence armed with an arrest warrant for a suspect
located inside. 6 7 The court conceded that Payton only dealt with police
59. See Agnew, 407 F.3d at 196 (applying Payton standard as whether police in
possession of arrest warrant had "probable cause to believe that the suspect is in
the home").
60. See id. (detailing police officers' basis for having probable cause to believe
defendant was inside residence).
61. See id. at 194 (reciting defendant's convictions).
62. See id. at 196 (describing events that occurred during defendant's arrest).
Specifically, the police saw a clear plastic bag filled with cocaine in plain view dur-
ing the arrest. See id. at 195 (same). Dauphin County assigned the case to the
Fugitive Task Force, which serves felony warrants, drug warrants and works on
other cases, because the defendant had previously evaded capture twice by jump-
ing out of a window and by holding onto the roof of a passing car. See id. at 194
(detailing warrants for defendant's arrest). The Fugitive Task Force eventually dis-
covered the defendant's location from an informant, and also learned that the
defendant possessed a firearm and narcotics. See id. at 194-95 (setting forth how
police obtained information regarding defendant's whereabouts).
63. See id. at 196 (using Payton as precedent for decision).
64. See id. at 196 (establishing that Payton requires police, armed with arrest
warrant, to have probable cause to believe suspect is inside home before entering
home where suspect is allegedly presiding).
65. See id. ("[A] valid misdemeanor arrest warrant 'carries with it the authority
to enter the residence of the person named in the warrant in order to execute the
warrant so long as the police have a reasonable belief that the suspect resides at the
place to be entered and that he is currently present in the dwelling.'" (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Clayton, 210 F.3d 841, 843 (8th Cir. 2000))).
66. See id. at 196 (phrasing Payton as requiring probable cause and affirming
defendant's conviction because probable cause existed in case).
67. See id. at 195-96 (addressing defendant's claim on appeal that police entry
was unconstitutional).
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entry into the home of the subject named in the warrant. 68 The court
held, however, that whether the home was the defendant's residence is
irrelevant because an entry pursuant to an arrest warrant does not violate a
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
69
In reaching this conclusion, the court first determined that if the de-
fendant lived at the address where he was arrested, his arrest would be
lawful under Payton, which involved the same situation. 70 Moreover, the
court determined that if the defendant did not live at that address, then
he may not have had a privacy interest in the residence and therefore
would lack standing to challenge the police officers' entry. 7 1 The court
distinguished Steagald v. United States,72 which held that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits police officers from entering a third party's home
to serve an arrest warrant on a suspect. 73 Specifically, the court reasoned
that Steagald protected the third-party owner's privacy interests and not the
suspect's own privacy interests. 74 Therefore, under Agnew, whether an ar-
68. See id. at 196 (limiting Payton's applicability to entry by police into dwell-
ing of subject of arrest warrant).
69. See id. at 195-96 (addressing constitutionality of police entry pursuant to
arrest warrant).
70. See id. (discussing Payton). For a discussion of the facts of Payton, see supra
note 32 and accompanying text.
71. See id. (explaining overnight guest is only individual with reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in third party residence) (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.
91, 95-97 (1990)); see also Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 1016 (asserting that according
to Supreme Court precedent, if police officers do not have search warrant when
they enter third party's home, third party owner has right to object, but temporary
guest does not).
72. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
73. See Agnew, 407 F.3d at 196-97 (discussing Steagald).
74. See id. (distinguishing Steagald to uphold police entry in instant case). The
court relied on the Ninth Circuit to support its reasoning:
A person has no greater right of privacy in another's home than in his
own. If an arrest warrant and reason to believe the person named in the
warrant is present are sufficient to protect that person's fourth amend-
ment privacy rights in his own home, they necessarily suffice to protect
his privacy rights in the home of another.
The right of a third party not named in the arrest warrant to the privacy
of his home may not be invaded without a search warrant. But this right is
personal to the home owner and cannot be asserted vicariously by the
person named in the arrest warrant.
Id. at 197 (quoting United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir.
1983)).
The Eleventh Circuit also employed this reasoning despite its interpretation of
"reason to believe" as something less than probable cause. SeeValdez v. McPheters,
172 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding different meanings in "reason to
believe" and "probable cause"). The court stated:
In the real world, people do not live in individual, separate, hermetically-
sealed residences. They live with other people, they move from one resi-
dence to another. Requiring that the suspect actually reside at the resi-
dence entered would mean that officers could never rely on Payton, since
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rest took place pursuant to an arrest warrant in the suspect's own home or
in the home of a third party, the Third Circuit will not hold that the police
entry violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
7 5
2. United States v. Edmonds
The Third Circuit, ten years prior to Agnew, briefly addressed the con-
stitutionality of a home arrest in United States v. Edmonds.7 6 In Edmonds,
when FBI agents entered Carlton Love's residence armed with a warrant
for his arrest, Love was not there; however, the agents found drug para-
phernalia in plain view. 77 The police eventually seized the paraphernalia
pursuant to a search warrant based on information contained in the arrest
warrant and the agents' visual observation of the paraphernalia in Love's
apartment.78 Although Love conceded that Payton allowed the agents to
enter his apartment pursuant to the arrest warrant, he argued that the
agents lacked reasonable grounds to believe that he was home, thus ren-
dering the subsequent search warrant invalid.
79
In holding that the agents had reason to believe that Love was in his
apartment, the court failed to employ any legal reasoning and relied solely
on its analysis of the relevant facts instead.80 Rather than mentioning
"probable cause" in its analysis, the Third Circuit framed the agent's in-
quiry as "a reason to believe," in sharp contrast to the words used in Agnew
years later.8 1 Thus, because the court failed to elaborate on what was re-
Payton and Steagald cannot be understood to divide the world into resi-
dences belonging solely to the suspect on the one hand, and third parties
on the other. The rule announced in Payton is applicable so long as the
suspect "possesses common authority over, or some other significant rela-
tionship to," the residence entered by police.
Id. (citing United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 217 (8th Cir. 1996)).
75. See Agnew, 407 F.3d at 197 ("Thus, even if [the defendant] was a non-
resident with a privacy interest, the Fourth Amendment would not protect him
from arrest by police armed with an arrest warrant.").
76. See generally United States v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236 (3d Cir. 1995).
77. See id. at 1247-48 (reciting facts of case).
78. See id. (same).
79. See id. at 1247 (setting forth Love's claim on appeal).
80. See id. at 1248 (setting forth all relevant facts that led agents to believe
Love was inside his apartment on day of his arrest). The court relied on the follow-
ing relevant facts in its holding: Love signed the apartment's lease; the gas account
for the apartment was under his name; a management representative of the apart-
ment complex confirmed Love lived in the apartment and described Love's black
Ford Mustang parked in front; the management representative later confirmed to
agents that he witnessed Love leave the apartment in the evening; the agents ar-
rived at the apartment at 6:45 a.m., a time at which they believed someone would
still be home; and the agents recognized Love's Mustang parked in front of the
apartment. See id. (offering support for holding that agents possessed reasonable
belief that Love was inside his apartment).
81. See id. at 1247 ("The district court concluded that the agents had reason to
believe Carlton Love was in his apartment on the morning of August 12th, and we
agree.") (emphasis added). But see'id. at 1248 (explaining that agents called Assis-
tant United States Attorney to determine whether they had probable cause to enter
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quired to attain a "reason to believe," Edmonds's only precedential value
for the Agnew court was how to undertake a factual inquiry. 82 Both Agnew
and Edmonds embody the relevant Third Circuit precedent and served as
the underlying foundation of the court's decision in Veal.
83
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. VEAL
A. Facts and Procedural History
The police arrested Samuel Veal in his wife's home on January 8,
2003, pursuant to two open arrest warrants-one for attempted murder
and the other for violating parole. 84 Veal's parole officer issued the pa-
role violation when he discovered that Veal no longer lived with his
mother, a required condition of his parole.85 The parole warrant specifi-
cally identified Veal's wife, Tina Veal, as a possible lead for information
about his whereabouts.
86
During the course of their investigation, the detectives visited several
addresses in order to find Veal. 87 At one such address, the police were
informed that Veal and his wife previously rented the property, but that
they subsequently moved. 88 Ultimately, the detectives discovered that the
Veals were living at 1848 South Conestoga Street in Philadelphia. 89 The
detectives visited that address between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. on January
8, 2003 and noticed a vehicle parked near the house that matched the
description of Veal's vehicle.90 After confirming that the vehicle was regis-
tered to Tina Veal, the detectives prepared a report for the Homicide Fu-
Love's residence). It is difficult to ascertain whether the Third Circuit agreed that
probable cause was necessary or whether the court was transcribing what the
agents asked the Assistant United States Attorney. See id. (describing Assistant
United States Attorney's phone call).
82. See id. at 1247-48 (analyzing relevant facts to determine how agents rea-
sonably believed Love was home).
83. See United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2006) (relying on
Agnew and Edmonds).
84. See id. at 165-66 (reciting facts of case). The Philadelphia detectives dis-
covered the open arrest warrants while investigating a homicide in which the vic-
tim's nephew claimed he sold drugs for Veal. See id. (same).
85. See id. at 165-66 (same). On January 6, 2003, the Philadelphia detectives
confirmed with the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (PBPP) that the
parole warrant remained valid and that Veal no longer resided with his mother.
See id. at 166 (describing steps police took to confirm parole warrant and Veal's
violation).
86. See id. (recounting details of parole warrant).
87. See id. (describing detectives' investigation into Veal's whereabouts).
88. See id. (reciting facts of case).
89. See id. (explaining how detectives discovered Tina Veal's address by re-
searching Philadelphia Housing Authority records).
90. See id. (stating facts of case). The detectives acquired a description of
Veal's vehicle from the murder victim's nephew to whom Veal also supplied drugs.
See id. (explaining how detectives identified vehicle as Veal's).
2007] CASEBRIEF 1035
15
McKeon: There's No Place Like Home - Except When You Are under Arrest: Th
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2007
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
gitive Squad and requested the squad to make an early morning arrest of
Veal.9 1
At 6:00 a.m., a member of the fugitive squad, accompanied by two
other detectives and additional uniformed police officers, went to the
house at 1848 South Conestoga Street.9 2 After confirming that the vehicle
driven by Veal and registered to Tina Veal remained in the driveway, the
detectives banged on the front door of the house. 93 After opening the
door and allowing the officers inside, Tina Veal claimed that her husband
was not home; however, the officers heard noises upstairs and discovered
Veal hiding under a bed holding two handguns. 94 The officers then ar-
rested Veal and seized evidence from the bedroom, including Veal's two
guns.
9 5
After Veal was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he moved to suppress all evidence
seized by the officers following his arrest, including the two guns.9 6 The
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania de-
nied Veal's motion to suppress and sentenced Veal to 120 months in
prison. 97 Veal appealed the denial of his suppression motion to the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals on two grounds.98 First, "he had a reasonable
91. See id. (describing procedure leading to Veal's arrest). Specifically, the
report stated that "Veal was wanted on a parole violation and an arrest warrant,
and that he was living at 1848 South Conestoga Street," which was Tina Veal's
listed address. See id. (outlining report for Fugitive Squad).
92. See id. (describing events preceding Veal's arrest).
93. See id. (detailing police officer's procedure). The officers identified them-
selves and stated they were serving an arrest warrant on Veal. See id. (same).
94. See id. (reciting sequence of events at Veal residence). Once the officers
arrived upstairs, Veal requested their help in removing himself from his hideout
location underneath the bed. See id. (same). An officer lifted the bed and found
Veal holding a pistol in each hand, with each pointed at an officer. See id. (same).
In response, the officer slammed the bed back down on top of Veal, which began
approximately forty minutes of negotiations, ultimately leading to Veal's surrender
and arrest. See id. (same).
95. See id. (noting evidence seized would later be used against Veal in court
and would form basis for criminal charge).
96 . See id. (noting grounds for Veal's indictment and motion to suppress). 18
U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g) (1) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person-who has been convicted in any court
of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or af-
fecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.
Id.
97. See Veal, 453 F.3d at 166-67 (setting forth results of suppression hearing).
After the suppression hearing, Veal entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his
right to challenge the denial of his suppression motion. See id. at 167 (describing
procedural history).
98. See id. (detailing procedural history and outlining Veal's arguments on
appeal).
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expectation of privacy while [present inside] his wife's residence." 99 Sec-
ond, the police lacked "probable cause to believe that he was both residing
at and present in the residence." 10 0
B. The Third Circuit's Analysis
The Third Circuit upheld the district court's decision to deny Veal's
motion to suppress the evidence seized from the bedroom where his arrest
occurred. 10 1 Despite framing its inquiry under Payton of whether the po-
lice had probable cause to believe that Veal was inside his home as requir-
ing a "reasonable belief," the court applied this standard using the term
"probable cause."10 2 Further, the court rejected Veal's argument that he
had a privacy interest while inside his wife's home.
0 3
1. Third Circuit Uses "Probable Cause" Standard
In its analysis, the court first set forth that Payton provides the appro-
priate constitutional standard applicable to the instant case. 10 4 The court
acknowledged that Payton does not specifically indicate whether courts
should apply a probable cause or reasonable belief standard to determine
whether a suspect is inside of a residence. 10 5 Further, the Third Circuit
expressed uncertainty about whether there is a difference between the two
standards. 10 6 In response to this uncertainty, the court looked to its own
precedent, specifically Agnew, which described the standard using "proba-
ble cause" language. 10 7 Moreover, as it did in Agnew, the Third Circuit
quoted the Payton standard as recited by the Tenth Circuit using the term
"reasonable belief' despite framing its own inquiry with the term "proba-
ble cause."
1 0 8
99. See id. at 167 (listing Veal's first argument on appeal).
100. See id. at 167 (listing Veal's second argument on appeal). Although Veal
did not specifically challenge the meaning of the Payton standard, his second argu-
ment on appeal required the Third Circuit to set forth its interpretation of the
Payton standard. See id. n.3 (noting Payton as constitutional standard for home
arrests and proceeding to articulate its position on requisite certainty required of
police before entering suspect's residence with arrest warrant).
101. See id. at 169 (affirming district court's decision).
102. See id. at 167 (framing Payton standard).
103. See id. (rejecting Veal's privacy argument).
104. See id. (setting forth constitutional framework applicable to instant case).
105. See id. 167 n.3 (discussing Payton standard).
106. See id. (questioning appropriate standard under Payton). The court went
on to state that most courts have held that the Payton standard "requires less proof
than probable cause." See id. at 167 (quoting Matthew A. Edwards, Posner's Pragma-
tism and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L. REv. 299, 363 (2002)).
107. See Veal 453 F.3d at 167 n.3 (explaining precedent to determine appro-
priate standard).
108. See id. at 167 (framing Payton as requiring reasonable belief). Specifi-
cally, the court acknowledged that "Payton requires that officers have 'a reasonable
belief the arrestee (1) lived in the residence, and (2) is within the residence at the
time of entry."' Id. (quoting United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir.
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The court held that under the facts of the instant case, the police
officers had probable cause to believe that Veal was inside of the resi-
dence.' 0 9 In undertaking a "common sense" approach, the court relied
on four factors to find probable cause that Veal lived at Tina Veal's resi-
dence.11 0 First, the parole violation warrant listed that Veal did not live
with his mother and identified Tina Veal as a lead. 11 1 Second, the Veals'
former landlord stated that Tina and Samuel Veal had recently lived to-
gether. 1 12 Third, the car described as Veal's was registered to Tina Veal
and was parked in front of her home. 1 3 Fourth, Veal was married to Tina
Veal.
114
The court then listed four facts that gave the police probable cause to
believe that Veal was located inside of the residence: first, the car Veal
drove was parked in front of the house; second, the officers arrived early
in the morning at a time when it was reasonable to expect that Veal would
still be home; third, the officers heard noises while in Tina Veal's living
room; and fourth, the officers knew of Veal's status as a fugitive who may
try to conceal his location. 115 Because the Third Circuit found that proba-
2001)). In the very next sentence, however, the court elaborated on the inquiry
and provided: "To determine whether the police had probable cause to believe that a
suspect was residing and present in a home, we apply a common sense approach
and consider the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforce-
ment agents, when viewed in the totality." Id. (defining inquiry) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
109. See id. at 168 (finding that facts supported police possessing probable
cause to believe Veal was inside residence). The Third Circuit relied upon other
circuit decisions that establish the common sense factors listed. See, e.g., United
States v. Lovelock, 170 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 1999) (using warrant as evidence for
location of defendant's address); United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1537
(11 th Cir. 1995) (considering tip by third party concerning where defendant lived
and noting evidence that defendant visited residence often).
110. See Veal, 453 F.3d at 168 (listing "common sense" factors to support con-
clusion that police officers had probable cause to believe that Veal resided with his
wife, Tina Veal).
111. See id. (describing first factor).
112. See id. (detailing second factor).
113. See id. (explaining third factor).
114. See id. (outlining fourth factor).
115. See id. (reciting relevant facts to support probable cause). The Third
Circuit used precedent from other circuits to support its characterization of the
relevant facts to establish probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d
1222, 1227 (10th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that any noise heard inside residence
suggested to officers that somebody was inside); id. (finding that police officers
can rely on suspect's status as criminal to conclude that suspect may conceal
whereabouts); United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 978 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting car
described as defendants parked outside of girlfriend's home); United States v.
Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1538 (11th Cir. 1995) ("The presence of a vehicle con-
nected to a suspect is sufficient to create the inference that the suspect is at
home."); Magluta, 44 F.3d at 1535 (establishing that police can assume person is
home at certain time of day).
[Vol. 52: p. 10211038
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ble cause existed, it declined to further discuss whether a lower standard
could apply. 16
2. Third Circuit Rejects Veal's Privacy Interest Argument
The court next rejected Veal's argument that he had a privacy interest
while inside of his wife's residence.1 17 The court held that even if he did
possess such an interest, the police still had probable cause to believe he
was residing at and present in the specific residence. 1 18 The court ac-
knowledged that Tina Veal's home was not Samuel Veal's residence." 19
Even so, the court followed Agnew and held that the police did not need a
separate search warrant to enter Tina Veal's home to arrest her hus-
band.1 20 The court then set forth the requirements of Payton, and using
the reasonable belief language, held that the police officers needed a rea-
sonable belief that the arrestee was living in the residence and was inside
the residence at the time. 12 1 While elaborating upon this standard, the
court reverted to using the term "probable cause."'122 The Third Circuit
ultimately concluded that the police officers had probable cause to believe
that Samuel Veal lived in Tina Veal's residence, and that he was inside the
residence at the time of police entry.'
23
IV. PREDICTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THIRD CIRCUIT PRACTITIONERS
Given the number of arrests that occur each year, it is important that
police officers, lawyers and judges share a similar understanding of the law
governing home arrests. 124 Challenging the constitutionality of an arrest
116. See Veal, 453 F.3d at 167 n.3 ("As we conclude that the probable cause
standard was met, we need not determine whether a possibly lower standard of
reasonable belief should be applied here.").
117. See id. at 167 (rejecting Veal's argument).
118. See id. (rejecting Veal's legal claim).
119. See id. at 167 n.4 (noting that Tina Veal's residence was not her hus-
band's residence because record revealed that Veal was required to live with his
mother).
120. See id. n.5 (distinguishing Veal's situation from Supreme Court's holding
in Steagald v. United States, which provided that search warrant was required to
enter third party's residence to arrest suspect). The Third Circuit relied on the
logic applied in Agnew that Steagald only protected the third party owner's interests
and not the suspect's privacy interests. See id. (same).
121. See id. at 167 (setting forth legal inquiry).
122. See id. at 167-68 (reverting to use of "probable cause" as requirement of
Payton despite using "reasonable belief' as standard in preceding sentence).
123. See id. at 168-69 (reciting holding of case).
124. See United States Marshals Service Investigative Services Fact Sheet,
USMS Pub. No. 21-B (Feb. 20, 2007), available at http://www.usmarshals.gov/du-
ties/factsheets/facts.pdf (providing that U.S. Marshals arrested more than 358,000
federal fugitives and cleared 41,000 felony warrants in 2005); id. (highlighting that
fugitive task forces led by Marshals Service arrested more than 46,800 state and
local fugitives and cleared 54,300 state and local felony warrants); Pennsylvania
Commission on Crime and Delinquency, Crime Trends, Number of Total Arrests
and Arrest Rates Per 100,000 Population: Pennsylvania, http://www.pccd.state.pa.
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is not only an important legal strategy for defense lawyers trying to get
their clients' charges dropped or moving to suppress evidence obtained as
a result of the arrest, but it also has serious consequences on Third Circuit
prosecutors who stand to lose access to incriminating evidence through
suppression hearings. 1 25 By addressing the constitutionality of a home ar-
rest and the subsequent admissibility of evidence acquired during the ar-
rest on a case-by-case factual basis, the Third Circuit leaves police officers
with the burden of instant decision-making. 126 If the court provided more
of a bright-line rule, however, police officers could avoid unconstitutional
home entries and the federal docket would no longer be burdened by
conducting factual inquiries.
127
Even if the Veal court had expressly adopted the probable cause stan-
dard, the Third Circuit would have at least clarified the appropriate stan-
dard for practitioners and police officers, leaving the substance of the
holding to the scrutiny of academics. 128 By leaving open the possibility in
Veal that a lesser standard than probable cause could exist under Payton,
the Third Circuit invites practitioners to argue for a lesser standard when
the particular facts arise. 129 For example, a prosecutor arguing against a
us/pccd/lib/pccd/stats/statsdata/paarrstsjtotjuvadlt.pdf (showing 80,257 arrests
made in Pennsylvania in 2004). See Miner, supra note 23, at 201 (concluding that
issue of home arrest is important for Supreme Court "to give the police a standard
they can work with, and to provide citizens the protection they deserve").
125. See United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 2006) (deciding on
constitutionality of home arrest raised by defendant as violative of Fourth Amend-
ment rights); United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1997) (ruling
whether to suppress evidence obtained during execution of arrest warrant at sus-
pect's dwelling); United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 214 (8th Cir. 1996) (same);
United States v. Lautner, 57 F.3d 212, 213 (2d Cir. 1995) (hearing challenge to
lower court's refusal to suppress firearm found by police while executing arrest
warrant in suspect's home).
126. See Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 1016 (contending that various Court deci-
sions on Fourth Amendment cause police to make confusing, yet instant
decisions).
127. See id. at 1018 (asserting that bright line rules for police regarding
Fourth Amendment issues would "greatly assist law enforcement officers to do
their jobs better and would ensure that dangerous criminals are not freed on tech-
nicalities that result from misinterpretations of these complex and arbitrary
rules.").
128. See generally Charles E. Moylan, Jr. & John Sonsteng, Fourth Amendment
Applicability, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 209, 236 (1990) (addressing that American
courts have always been flooded with litigation which leaves no time to resolve
Fourth Amendment questions "merely of academic interest"); Carol S. Steiker, Of
Cities, Rainforests, and Frogs: A Response to Allen and Rosenberg, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
1203, 1206-07 (1998) (noting scholarly interest and disagreement over Fourth
Amendment). But see Thomas M. Finnegan, Scope of the Fourth Amendment, 74 GEO.
L.J. 499, 502 n.13 (1986) (stating that determination of whether particular action
constitutes search and seizure consistent with Fourth Amendment "is not just an
academic exercise").
129. See United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (describ-
ing confusion over Payton standard and acknowledging that another standard
could exist).
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motion to suppress evidence obtained during a home arrest, who lacks
strong evidence that the police had probable cause to believe the suspect
was inside, should argue under Veal that a lesser standard than probable
cause exists.13 0 Conversely, a defense attorney in the Third Circuit should
argue in favor of a higher standard, probable cause, to prove that police
did not have the requisite belief that the defendant was inside of his
home.
13 '
If the Third Circuit were ever to address the issue of which standard
Payton requires, the court might likely find significant incongruence be-
tween "reason to believe" and "probable cause."' 3 2 Nevertheless, based on
the court's substitution of the phrase "reason to believe" with "probable
cause" in both Veal and Agnew, it is equally likely that that the court does
not differentiate between the two. 13 3 Such an analysis would not be novel
as commentators have acknowledged that even if the Payton court sought a
lesser standard than probable cause, both standards have been applied
leniently, and not much difference exists between the two.
1 3 4
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, although a significant difference might not exist be-
tween the "reasonable belief' and "probable cause" standards for home
entry to arrest, a firm holding by the Third Circuit would resolve any lin-
gering questions left open by Veal.1 3 5 Better yet, if the Supreme Court
articulated the appropriate standard, it would end the existing circuit
130. See id. (addressing standard of less than probable cause).
131. See, e.g., United States v.Jones, 641 F.2d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding
police with arrest warrant lacked probable cause to believe suspect was inside
residence).
132. See Edwards, supra note 4, at 361 (contending that examination of Pay-
ton's progeny could lead to conclusion that "reason to believe" rule "is a remarka-
bly relaxed standard that is almost always satisfied").
133. See id. at 373 (finding that courts have been content with slim evidence
of suspect's presence in residence and some courts appear to use "probable cause"
and "reasonable belief' interchangeably). The Third Circuit's use of both terms in
Agnew and Payton tends to support this conclusion. See Veal; 453 F.3d at 167 (using
terms "probable cause" and "reason to believe" to describe same standard); United
States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2005) (same). But see Veal, 453 F.3d at
167 n.3 (leaving open possibility that lesser standard than probable cause exists, as
evidenced by other circuit court holdings).
134. See Edwards, supra note 4, at 373 (arguing that court applying probable
cause standard is just as lenient as court applying reasonable belief standard). Ed-
wards provides an alternative approach to this dilemma by contending that empiri-
cal pragmatism would encourage judges to look beyond cases to reality of home
arrests in rendering a decision. See id. at 374 (proposing solution to probable cause
versus reasonable belief dilemma).
135. For a discussion of the theory that there is no difference between the two
standards, see supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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split. 136 Such a distinction has wide-ranging impact on police officers in
executing arrest warrants, practitioners in prosecuting or defending vic-
tims of home arrests, and individual residents of the Third Circuit who
would like to remain aware of their Fourth Amendment rights. 13 7 Based
solely on Third Circuit precedent in applying Payton, the court will likely
find that a difference does not exist between the two standards, and the
court will thus continue to use the phrases interchangeably.' 3 8 Such a
decision would have to overcome the hurdle already addressed by other
circuits that the Supreme Court intentionally phrased the inquiry as "rea-
son to believe" when it could have easily used the term "probable
cause."1 39 Nonetheless, the court exudes hope that a lesser standard exists
as acknowledged by its sister circuits.1 40 As such, the Third Circuit should
adopt a lesser standard consistent with the plain language of Payton and
consistent with its interpretation by a majority of its sister circuits.'
4 1
Kristin S. McKeon
136. See generally Current Circuit Splits, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 191, 229-30
(2006) (documenting existing circuit split over appropriate Payton standard, par-
ticularly between Sixth and Ninth Circuits).
137. See Miner, supra note 23, at 201 (asserting that clarification of Payton
would "give the police a standard they can work with, and.., provide citizens the
protection they deserve.").
138. For a discussion of Third Circuit precedent in interpreting Payton and
using phrase "probable cause" interchangeably with "reason to believe," see supra
notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of other circuits' interpretation of Payton based on thor-
ough analysis of Supreme Court's word choice, see supra notes 37-53 and accompa-
nying text.
140. See United States v. Veal, 453 F.3d 164, 167 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting
possibility of lesser standard than probable cause in Third Circuit, as acknowl-
edged by sister circuits).
141. See Edwards, supra note 4, at 363 (finding that this interpretation re-
spects the Court's choice of a "unique formulation, reason to believe"). For a dis-
cussion of the circuit courts which have adopted a lesser standard, see supra note
45 and accompanying text.
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